

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

OMAR L. BROWN, (NMN),

Petitioner,

ORDER

v.

05-C-358-C

STEPHEN HOBART, Warden,
Federal Correctional Institution,
Oxford,

Respondent.

Petitioner Omar L. Brown is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. He has filed a pleading styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and requests leave to proceed in the action under the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

In his pleading it appears that petitioner is alleging that prison officials are making false claims that he received drugs during a visit from his wife because his wife is white and he is black. Petitioner alleges that he is being held in segregation and has been advised to inform his wife that she is never to return to the prison. Petitioner requests an order directing his immediate transfer from the Oxford facility.

Because petitioner's claim concerns the conditions of his confinement and not the length or duration of his incarceration, the claim is not properly raised in a habeas corpus action. The injury alleged in a claim, and not the relief sought in the claim, determines whether a claim is cognizable in habeas corpus or should instead be brought as a civil action. Clayton-El v. Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1996). Even if petitioner were to prove that prison officials are taking action against petitioner because of his color and the color of his wife, he would not be entitled to release or modification of his sentence. The injury he alleges is a claim that must be raised in a civil action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has given somewhat mixed signals regarding what district courts should do when a pro se prisoner mislabels his pleadings. In Copus v. City of Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 1996), the court stated: A "district court [is] not authorized to convert a § 1983 [or Bivens] action into a § 2254 action. . . . When a plaintiff files a § 1983 action that cannot be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice." However, in Valona v. United States Parole Commission, 165 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1998), the court held that the district court had erred in refusing to convert a habeas corpus action into a mandamus action if that was how the suit should have been styled. The court wrote, "If Valona is entitled to a writ of mandamus, then the district court should have provided him

that relief in the suit he has filed, rather than requiring him to start over.” Id. at 510. See also Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering merits of habeas corpus petition that was brought under § 1983).

One way that these cases can be reconciled is if they are interpreted not as setting forth rigid rules without exceptions but as general guidelines that should be followed when the reasons for doing so are present. In Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2000), the court noted that “[p]risoners may be tempted to choose one route rather than another to avoid limitations imposed by Congress.” See also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting different procedural requirements and consequences of § 1983 and habeas corpus statutes as reasons for refusing to convert action).

In this case, petitioner may be attempting to avoid a number of limitations by filing his civil rights claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The filing fee for Bivens actions is \$250 as opposed to \$5 for actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Further, the requirements for exhausting administrative remedies are much stricter in Bivens suits than in § 2241 actions. Compare Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2000) (court must dismiss action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies once defendant raises the issue) with Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) (court may waive exhaustion requirements in § 2241 cases in some circumstances). In habeas corpus actions, the proper respondent is petitioner’s custodian, whereas in a Bivens action, a petitioner may

proceed against any federal officer who is alleged to have been personally involved in violating his constitutional rights. Finally, actions under Bivens are subject to the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act, whereas habeas corpus actions are not. Under the PLRA, the court must assess petitioner an initial partial payment of the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), screen his complaint before it is served on the defendants and dismiss it promptly if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and collect the remaining portion of the filing fee from his prison account even if his request for leave to proceed with his action is denied, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). In addition, if petitioner's complaint is dismissed for one of the reasons listed above, he will earn a "strike" under the three strikes provision of § 1915, § 1915(g).

Therefore, although I will not dismiss this case, I decline to convert petitioner's action until he has clarified his intentions. It is possible that petitioner purposely filed a habeas corpus action because he wishes to avoid an action that is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and its many provisions. Therefore, I will give petitioner until July 15, 2005, in which to inform the court in writing whether he wants his case to be treated as a Bivens action or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner should bear in mind that if he chooses to proceed under § 2241, I will promptly dismiss the case on the ground that petitioner has not alleged facts entitling him to habeas corpus relief. If he chooses to proceed

in a civil action under Bivens, he is to so advise the court and provide the court with a copy of his trust fund account statement for the past six months so that I can assess him an initial partial payment of the \$250 fee for filing a civil complaint.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that petitioner Omarr L. Brown may have until July 15, 2005, in which to inform the court whether he wishes this court to treat his pleading as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or as a complaint in a civil action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). If he chooses to proceed under Bivens, he may have until July 15, 2005, in which to submit a trust fund account statement for the period beginning approximately January 1, 2005 and ending approximately July 1, 2005, so that I can assess him an initial partial payment of the \$250 filing fee. If petitioner fails to respond to this order by July 15, 2005, I will treat his action

as a habeas corpus action and dismiss the case for his failure to allege facts to show that he is in custody in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.

Entered this 24th day of June, 2005.

BY THE COURT:
/s/
BARBARA B. CRABB
District Judge