IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN	
JEROME CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. WARDEN SCIBANA, F.C.I. Oxford,	ORDER 04-C-311-C
Respondent.	
In White v. Scibana, F. Supp. 2d, No	
Wis. Apr. 23, 2004), I concluded that the Burea	au of Prisons was acting contrary to 18
U.S.C. 3624(b) by calculating petitioner Yancey W	hite's good conduct time on the basis or
the actual time he had served rather than his impos	sed sentence. I granted White's petitior
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 224	l and ordered the warden to recalculate

Like White, petitioner Jerome Campbell is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. His petition under § 2241 raises the same issue as that in White: he alleges that the bureau is calculating his good conduct time on the basis of time served rather than the sentence imposed. Petitioner has paid the \$5 filing fee.

White's good conduct time in accordance with § 3624(b).

In an order dated May 26, 2004, I ordered respondent Scibana to show cause why the petition should not be granted. In his response, respondent concedes that the legal issue in this case is identical to that in White. In addition, he concedes that petitioner is entitled to release *now* if the method for calculating good conduct time affirmed in White is employed. See Resp. to Request for Adm. Remedy, attached to, Aff. of Linette Ritter, Attachment 1, dkt. #8 ("An award of 990 days subtracted from your January 7, 2007, full term date would result in an already reached April 22, 2004 release date.").

Nevertheless, respondent has moved to stay the proceedings in this case pending his appeal in White. Respondent's primary argument is that it would be burdensome to apply White across the board. He writes: "This Court's decision in White will have a significant impact on the BOP as it may affect as many as 140,000 sentence calculations of inmates presently in its custody." Response, dkt. #6, at 5. I note first that this court may not exercise jurisdiction over nonconsenting wardens in other judicial districts. Moore v. Olson, No. 03-4053, 2004 WL 1088316 (7th Cir. May 17, 2004) (§ 2241(a) requires petitions to be brought in judicial district in which petitioner is incarcerated unless warden waives requirement). Thus, the number of inmates potentially affected by White is a significantly lower number; respondent states that there are 1200 inmates in the Oxford prison, which is the only federal prison in the Western District of Wisconsin.

Second, respondent does not explain persuasively why it would be burdensome to

recalculate the good conduct time of inmates in accordance with <u>White</u>. It is the *bureau's* calculation that is complex. The basic calculation under <u>White</u> is very simple: multiplying the number of years in an inmate's sentence by 54 and then prorating any remaining months. It is not clear why applying this method to even more than 1000 inmates would be overly time consuming or expensive. In any event, I need not consider the potentially broad implications of <u>White</u> in this case. Petitioner seeks only to have <u>White</u> applied to him. *No* additional work needs to be done to recalculate his good conduct time because the parties agree that he should be out now under the White standard.

Respondent makes a second argument: "Additionally, any inmates whose release date, like the petitioner, is computed under the <u>White</u> rule to occur before the Seventh Circuit decides <u>White</u> will be released before the completion of their lawful sentences." Response, dkt. #6, at 5-6. Of course, this argument assumes that <u>White</u> is incorrect. If I grant respondent's motion to stay and the court of appeals affirms <u>White</u>, this will mean that petitioner and others like him will be denied their freedom in violation of the law.

Respondent cannot argue seriously that a weighing of the balance of potential harms favors his position. He does not identify any reason beyond the fact of potential premature release that supports a stay. On the other hand, a stay would prejudice petitioner greatly as it would be akin to a denial of his petition. Under the bureau's calculation, petitioner is scheduled for release on August 28, 2004. Even if respondent seeks and obtains expedited

review of White, it could be several months before a decision is reached. As the Supreme

Court has recognized, *any* unlawful increase in a prisoner's sentence causes him substantial

prejudice. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 204 (2001). The harm caused to

petitioner with every passing day by illegally depriving him of his freedom cannot be

compared to the potential harm to respondent if petitioner is released less than three months

before the time calculated by the bureau. Respondent's motion for a stay will be denied and

the petition will be granted.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that respondent Scibana's motion to stay the proceedings in this

case is DENIED. FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that petitioner Jerome Campbell's petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Respondent is directed to release petitioner from

the Federal Correction Institution immediately.

Entered this 4th day of June, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

BARBARA B. CRABB

District Judge

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